Cheque bounce, also known as dishonour of cheque, occurs when a bank refuses to honour a cheque due to insufficient funds or other reasons. Types of Cheque Bounce: Cheque Bounce Procedure: Cheque Bounce Laws: Consequences of Cheque Bounce: Cheque Bounce Case Filing Process: Cheque Bounce Case Documents: Cheque Bounce Case Fees: Cheque Bounce Case Timeline: Cheque Bounce Prevention:
Criminal Cases Lawyer in Delhi
Supreme Court Judgement Conviction for attempted murder can be upheld even if the injuries inflicted on the victim were minor/simple in nature. An attempt to commit murder under S.307 of the IPC can be established irrespective of minor injuries. The key focus lies in proving the accused’s intent and overt actions to commit the crime. The severity of the injuries sustained is not the defining factor under this statute. It emphasizes proving the accused’s intention and actions aligned with attempting murder. S.307 centers on demonstrating the accused’s intent and tangible steps taken toward committing the crime, regardless of the extent of injury.
Divorce Lawyer in Delhi.
Best Divorce Lawyer in Delhi. Divorce cases involve the legal dissolution of a marriage, often involving complex emotional, financial, and logistical issues. Here’s an overview of divorce cases: Types of Divorce Cases: Divorce Case Process: Issues in Divorce Cases: Divorce Case Outcomes: By understanding divorce cases, individuals can better navigate the complex and emotional process of divorce.
Nixon in 1968: drug abuse is “public enemy number one.” “In order to fight and defeat this enemy,” he continued, “it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.” With that statement, the “war on drugs” began.
John Ehrlichman, a top Nixon aide (1994): The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.… Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course, we did. Introduction The presumption of innocence is a sacrosanct principle in criminal law. The Apex court states forms a part of “due process of law” under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Erosion of this presumption has been justified using counterweighing principles of “higher” importance, such as public welfare. One such example of a “reverse onus clause” is S. 35 of the NDPS Act (“Act”). S. 35(1) states that for all offences under the act, a “culpable mental state” is to be presumed. It is further laid down that the “fact” that the accused had no culpable mental state has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Over the course of this article, I engage with three questions concerning this provision. First, what are the justifications for the state to adopt such a law? Second, stemming from these justifications, can the presumption of constitutionality protect laws granting draconian powers to the state? And last, can a balance be struck between the legal presumption of innocence and the presumption of constitutionality? Identifying the Rationale The Apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah states that the right to be presumed innocent is a part of the right to a fair trial of an accused. What justifies the state to usurp this right? I outline three broad justifications used by authors, reports and judgments of the ‘reverse burden’. First, the “risk” to “public welfare”. Ashworth argues that the state tends to weigh such offences against the “risk” the offenders cause by being a part of society. In this case, the offender’s presence in society would likely result in an overall increase in drug use and would therefore be damaging to public welfare. This is reflected in the reasoning used in High Court bail orders. Nixon in 1968: drug abuse is “public enemy number one.” “In order to fight and defeat this enemy,” he continued, “it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.” With that statement, the “war on drugs” began. John Ehrlichman, a top Nixon aide (1994): The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.… Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course, we did. Introduction The presumption of innocence is a sacrosanct principle in criminal law. The Apex court states forms a part of “due process of law” under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Erosion of this presumption has been justified using counterweighing principles of “higher” importance, such as public welfare. One such example of a “reverse onus clause” is S. 35 of the NDPS Act (“Act”). S. 35(1) states that for all offences under the act, a “culpable mental state” is to be presumed. It is further laid down that the “fact” that the accused had no culpable mental state has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Over the course of this article, I engage with three questions concerning this provision. First, what are the justifications for the state to adopt such a law? Second, stemming from these justifications, can the presumption of constitutionality protect laws granting draconian powers to the state? And last, can a balance be struck between the legal presumption of innocence and the presumption of constitutionality? Identifying the Rationale The Apex court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah states that the right to be presumed innocent is a part of the right to a fair trial of an accused. What justifies the state to usurp this right? I outline three broad justifications used by authors, reports and judgments of the ‘reverse burden’. First, the “risk” to “public welfare”. Ashworth argues that the state tends to weigh such offences against the “risk” the offenders cause by being a part of society. In this case, the offender’s presence in society would likely result in an overall increase in drug use and would therefore be damaging to public welfare. This is reflected in the reasoning used in High Court bail orders. Second, difficulty in meeting the ordinary burden of the prosecution; the court in Noor Aga has recognized the purpose of the legislature to reduce the burden on the prosecution in certain cases. Further in Manoj, the court further strengthened this defense by stating thatsince the accused can rebut these presumptions, these presumptions are proportionate and reasonable. Third, the severity of these criminal acts. Nixon led America (and consequently, the world) into the “Just Say No” campaign against drugs, followed by an era of criminalization and prohibition leading to legislations like the Act. There is an embedded presumption that the use and propagation are severely harmful to the societal welfare. Using these justifications, it is argued that the law operates on the following line of reasoning: The presumption of innocence can lead an offender to be acquitted. An accused guilty of such a grave offence against the welfare of the society cannot go unpunished. The law must therefore combat the possibility of the acquittal of a possible offender. This line of reasoning has been held to be valid in Noor Aga. Sitting on the Constitutional Fence “When two elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled.” The reasoning adopted by the Court in Noor Aga is an act of ‘Judicial negotiation’ in “reverence” to the legislative mandate. Many principles adopted by Noor Aga have since been refuted by the judicial, empirical or doctrinaldevelopments. First, Noor Aga relies on the principle that it is an “established principle” that presumption of innocence is only a human right and not a constitutional right. The court however, in subsequent
Domestic Violence – A Cruel Reality Of Modern India
Let’s first understand the phrase “domestic violence.” Let’s consider them as two separate words. “Domestic” means “within the realm or the household territory” and “violence” means “using physical force to hurt and to cause damage”. Therefore, as a phrase “domestic violence” is a “pattern of coercive and assaultive behaviours that include physical, sexual, verbal, and psychological attacks and economic coercion that adults or adolescents use against their intimate partner”. Domestic violence against women: On papers, it is said that the position of women holds the society’s index of cultural and spiritual attainment. But we all know that women struggle to pursue respectable careers and work to come at par to their male counterparts. Domestic violence happens in rural areas, towns, cities and in metropolitans as well. Irrespective of social classes, genders, racial aspects and age groups we find domestic violence happening in Indian households. According to ‘United Nation Population Fund Report’, around two-third of married Indian women are victims of Domestic Violence attacks and as many as 70% of married women in India between the age of 15 and 49 are victims of beating, rape or forced sex. In India, more than 55 percent of the women suffer from Domestic Violence, especially in the states of Bihar, U.P., M.P. and other northern states. Justices Dipak Misra and Shiva Kriti Singh sentenced a man to five years in jail for torturing his pregnant wife who ultimately committed suicide. They claimed that “This resembles the tale of so many similar young ladies who end their life due to untold miseries and hardships faced by them within the confines of the four walls of their matrimonial home.” According to Unicef‘s Global Report Card on Adolescents 2012, 57% of boys and 53% of girls in India think a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife. The dowry system, horror killing, and patriarchal norms against women have resulted in extreme and numerous cases of domestic violence. Domestic violence against men: The violence against women have been prominent in India but domestic violence against men is also gaining momentum. The patriarchal system disguises men to not be vulnerable to domestic violence. Rukma Chary, the General Secretary of Save Indian Family Foundation claims, “Domestic violence against men in India is not recognised by the law. The general perception is that men cannot be victims of violence. This helps women get away scot-free” #domesticviolencecaseslawyerindelhi #divorcecaseslawyerindelhi #familymatterscaseslawyerindelhi #familymatterslawyerindelhi #advocatesindelhi #lawyerindelhi #lawfirmindelhi
Types of cases addressed in family courts
ommon cases heard in family courts India is one of the countries with the largest population, due to which there are many married couples in the country. While having this large number of married couples, there will be more chances of having more cases of disputes between the couples and their family. And for seeking remedy they will surely approach the courts. In India, the family court can accept the appeals for grant of decree of divorce under various acts like Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, the Divorce Act, 1869, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 etc. For the dissolution of Hindu marriage, one can file an appeal for divorce under Hindu Marriages (validation of proceedings) Act, 1960. In the case of Reddy Anada Rao v. Ms Totavani Sujatha, the appellant and the respondent were living their life by following Christian religion but they got married as per the Hindu rituals in a Hindu temple. The appellant i.e. the husband claimed that he was forced to marry the respondent therefore, he appealed for the dissolution of his marriage and to set aside his marriage certificate. The question was raised by the office of the family court that the marriage was itself null and void as per the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 so there is no need for the suit. The judge held that the appeal for dissolution of marriage is not maintainable in the family court as Section 5 and Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act has clearly laid down that the marriage is null and void if it has been done with coercion or without the consent of any party. Later, the husband appealed in the High Court for which the court held that as per the Explanation (a) of Section 7 of Family Courts Act, 1984, the family court has jurisdiction in the concerned matter. As per the provisions of this act, the family court has jurisdiction over the disputes arising out of the marriage of any caste or creed. The explanation (g) in Section 7(1) provides that the family court has jurisdiction to grant the custody of the child to a proper person and to make that right person the guardian of a minor. The cases related to the custody of the child are filed before the family court where he usually resides. For example, if the father is residing in Uttar Pradesh and the mother along with the minor child is residing in Mumbai and the father wants to have custody of the child then he has to file the case in Mumbai’s family court. Thus, the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over child custody cases. The family court has also the power to accept the petitions made under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The family courts act has not specifically mentioned the jurisdiction of the family court in matters of domestic violence. And this is the area where family courts are lacking. Though the act hasn’t made any provision related to the matters of domestic violence. However, there is a provision under the Protection of women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005(hereinafter DV Act), according to which the family court can entertain the matters related to domestic violence. The DV Act is not wholly a criminal law; it has also granted powers to the civil and family courts. As per Section 26 of the DV Act, the victim can not only claim relief from the Magistrate but also from the family court and other civil courts. In the case of Sudhannya K.N. vs. Umasanker Valsan (2013), the Kerala High Court discussed the scope of DV Act and held that the scope of DV Act is wide as it guarantees rights to women to approach either magistrate or family court for filing suit according to her comfort zone. The court also held that the family court has the power to pass the interim protection orders as well as interim residence orders under Section 26 of the DV Act. However, Section 26 is not used adequately because the powers of the family court are not properly described as in the matters related to domestic violence and also the family courts are not clear about their jurisdiction under Section 26 of the DV Act. Due to this, most of the victims approach the Magistrate instead of the family courts. Under the family court act, explanation(f) of Section 7(1) clearly provides that the family courts have jurisdiction over the suits or proceedings for maintenance. Also under Section 7(2), the family courts have the power to exercise a jurisdiction which is exercised by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is related to maintenance of wife, children and parents. This means the family courts can grant maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC. The Supreme Court recently in the case of Rana Nahid v. Sahisul Haq Chisti (2020) has given a contrasting judgement over the jurisdiction of the family court under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (1986 Act). The facts of the case are: a Muslim woman moved to the family court of Ajmer under Section 125 of CrPC for claiming maintenance from her husband as she was harassed for dowry and was thrown out of the home. The family court accepted the application made under Section 125 of CrPC, as an application under Section 3 of the 1986 Act. The family court ordered the husband to pay Rs 3 Lakh to his wife and Rs 2000 every month for the maintenance of his child. The husband moved to the High Court against the order of the family court and questioned the jurisdiction of the family court under the 1986 Act. The High Court held that the family court has no jurisdiction to pass such an order under the 1986 Act. However, the petitioner can approach the Court of competent Magistrate under Section 3 of the 1986 Act. The wife approached the Supreme Court against