Introduction The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is the legislation that governs the administration of criminal proceedings in the country. It was enacted in 1973. Offences are classified into two based on their bailable nature, i.e., bailable offences and non-bailable offences. An offence in simple language is an act or an omission prohibited by law. The concept of bail is still controversial in our country because the public feels that the accused might flee after issuing a bail. There are three types of bail namely regular bail, interim bail, and anticipatory bail. This article briefly discusses the concept of anticipatory bail and important case laws decided in its regard in the Supreme Court. Bailable offence A bailable offence is an offence that is not on its own very serious in nature. The bail may be granted to the accused only if he satisfies the essentials of procuring bail. Examples of bailable offences: Selling noxious foods or drinks, rioting with a weapon, fabrication of false evidence, etc. Bail The term bail is not defined anywhere in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In general, bail is defined as a process of releasing an accused for a sum and it is also a promise that he will be attending the Court proceedings in the future. Bail is argued to be a right of the individual that is granted by the Constitution under Article 21. If a person has committed an offence that is bailable in nature, he can demand bail. He needs to sign a “bail bond” which contains the terms and conditions on which a person will be released on bail. Any person who is on bail should stay within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. Aasu v. the State of Rajasthan (2017) Facts of this case: All 4 accused in this case are booked under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The lower court granted anticipatory bail for all the other co-accused. The petitioner in the instant case also filed an application for anticipatory bail which was not decided for a long time. He challenged the same in the High Court.Issue: Whether there is a prescribed time limit that a court shall dispose off bail applications?Judgement: The Court has delivered a judgement that all the bail applications shall be disposed within a week of their filing. Types of Bail There are 3 types of bail available for a person. They are: Regular Bail A person who is arrested and in police custody can apply for a regular/daily bail. Bail provisions are given under Section 437 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI 2011 Facts of this case: The accused were charged with manipulation and misappropriation to influence UAS licences of the telecom industry. The Special Judge CBI, rejected the bail applications of the accused for which the accused appealed the validity of the said rejection of bail in the High Court of Delhi which was denied on 23.05.2011. The accused appealed to the Apex Court.Issue: Whether the Court can reject an application of bail without proper reasoning?Judgement: The Supreme Court delivered a judgement mentioning that the grant and rejection of bail application are at the sole discretion of the Court as the situations and circumstances should be carefully studied before grant or rejection of bail. Interim Bail Interim bail is awarded by a direct order of the Court to temporarily release an accused for a short term. The Courts noticed that interim bails are being misused in many cases and have decreased the number of interim bails issued. Anticipatory Bail Anticipatory bails are issued prior to the arrest of a person. It is also called a pre-arrest bail. It is mentioned under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as ‘grant apprehending arrest’. The requirement of anticipatory bail has seen a rise in the early 1990s when there were a lot of false cases being filed on businessmen. To protect the interests of the public, the Law Commission has suggested adding a provision prohibiting arrest beforehand. As it is a matter of the personal liberty of a man, it was added to the Code. According to Section 438 of CrPC, a person having committed an offence anticipates his arrest wherein he can approach the High Court or the Sessions Court for anticipatory bail. It is at the discretion of the Court whether to grant bail or reject the same. It solely depends on the circumstances and the seriousness of the offence. Anticipatory bail can be granted for a non-bailable offence and will be valid only if the person has no direct connection or when the Court believes that the person is innocent. Cancellation of Bail Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. the State of Maharashtra (2001) Facts of this case: The accused filed an application for bail after non-completion of investigation by the investigation agency.Issue: Whether the Court can reject or cancel bail after the challan is issued?Judgement: The Court cleared that the custody of the accused after the challan is not governed under Section 167 CrPC. The Apex Court has delivered its verdict stating that bail can be cancelled at any time even when he is at his committal proceedings. Important cases on Anticipatory Bail Grant of Anticipatory Bail Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. the State of Punjab (1980) The very first landmark judgement was given by the Apex Court is in the case of Gurbaksh Singh v. the State of Punjab. Facts: The Minister of irrigation and power being Mr. Gurubaksh Singh and others from the government were facing serious allegations of corruption and misuse of power. They had  applied for anticipatory bail in the High Court, but it was rejected. They filed an SLP for the Supreme Court to consider the case. Are you Looking for Lawyer or Advocate in Delhi your search ends here we provide all kind of litigation Matters in ALL District courts of delhi ,High Court And Supreme Court of India . #criminalcaseslawyerindelhi. #bailcaseslawyerindelhi #divorcecaseslawyerindelhi #domesticviolencecaseslawyerindelhi. #chequebouncecaseslawyerindelhi #criminalcaseslawyerinsupremecourtofindia. #bailcaseslawyerinsupremecourtofindia. #cybercrimelawyerindelhi

Sushil Kumari Dang v. Prem Kumar Here, a petition for restitution of conjugal right is filed by the husband and the husband accuses his wife for adulterous conduct. Following which he filed another petition for judicial separation which shows the extent of his sincerity and interest in keeping the wife with him. So, the Delhi High Court set aside the decree of restitution granted by the lower court. Yousuf v. Sowramina It was held that at times, the determination of the question whether in fact a marriage has broken down or not is left to the courts. At other times, the legislature lays down the criterion of breakdown of a marriage and if that is established, the courts have no option but to dissolve the marriage. Ankush Narayan v. Janabai Court held that on adoption by a widow, the adopted son becomes the son of the deceased adoptive father and the position under the old Hindu law as regards ties in the adoptive family is not changed. Guradas v. Rasaranjan Adoption is made when the actual giving and taking had taken place and not when the religious ceremony is performed like Datta Homam.  For a valid adoption, it would be necessary to bring on records that there has been an actual giving and taking ceremony. Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhary In this case, the court rejected the plea that personal law was discriminatory towards Gender inequality in India. It also observed that introduction of Constitutional law into the home (referring to personal laws) was most inappropriate. Jijabai v. Pathan Khan Where the father and mother had fallen out and the mother was living separately for over 20 years and was managing the affairs of her minor daughter the apex Court observed though the father was alive but he was not taking any interest in the affairs of the minor and should be treated as if non-existent, and, hence, the mother is  the natural guardian of the minor’s person as well as property. Sitabai v. Ramchandra So there may be relationship by implication in the other cases also. The Supreme Court has also held that a son adopted by the widow of the deceased coparcener will also be a coparcener with the surviving coparceners of the deceased husband. Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of India The Court held that if a Hindu converts to Muslim and then have a second marriage, he can not do so, irrespective of the fact that polygamy is allowed in Islamic Law. #familymatterscaseslawyerindelhi #familylawyerindelhi #familymatterslawyerindelhi #advocateindelhi #bestadvocateindelhi #domesticviolencelawyerindelhi

Implications of Change in Terminology The term ‘mental illness’ has been introduced in the BNSS without providing any definition. However, the BNS clarifies that ‘mental illness’ shall have the same meaning as provided under s.2(a) MHCA.[4] The MHCA defines ‘mental illness’ as ‘a substantial disorder of thinking, mood, perception, orientation or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behaviour, capacity to recognise reality or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, mental conditions associated with the abuse of alcohol and drugs, but does not include mental retardation which is a condition of arrested or incomplete development of mind of a person, specially characterised by subnormality of intelligence.’.[5] Thus, the definition of ‘mental illness’ unambiguously excludes ‘mental retardation’ from its scope. There is a clear distinction between ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental retardation’, and the law has consciously sought to treat both differently. While mental illness can be treated,[6] mental retardation is an ‘organic disablement of the mind’ which one may be taught to cope with, but cannot be ‘cured’.[7] The term ‘mental retardation’ has now been widely replaced by ‘intellectual disability’,[8] which is defined under the RPwD.[9] Persons with intellectual disability (mental retardation) have high support needs which need to be accommodated under the law. Acknowledging the need for protection of persons with mental illness or ‘mental retardation’, the Law Commission also recognised the need for a different procedure under the CrPC for the latter category of persons.[10]Even though conceptually different, both mental illness and intellectual disability (mental retardation) have been classified as ‘specified disabilities’ under the RPwD Act,[11] and have been beneficiaries of protections under the fitness to stand trial framework. The CrPC currently uses ‘unsound mind’, ‘lunatics’ and ‘mental retardation’ in the fitness to stand trial framework. The term ‘unsound’ has suffered from a lack of definitional clarity, leading to inconsistent application of protections under the law.[12] However, this term is broad enough to include varying degrees of mental illness[13] as well as mental retardation[14] within its scope. By using consistent terminology of ‘mental illness’, the BNSS proposes some clarity about who is eligible for protection under the law. However, troublingly, it also unambiguously excludes an important category of persons (persons with intellectual disability) thereby denying them their fair trial rights and protection under the BNSS. II. Procedural Anomalies Ss.329 and 330 CrPC, provides two distinct procedures to deal with persons with mental illness and persons with intellectual disability (mental retardation), who are incapable of making their defence. By excluding persons with intellectual disability, the BNSS fails to recognise the separate framework that was designed under the CrPC for this category of persons. Consequently, the BNSS suffers from procedural anomalies that adversely impact the treatment of both persons with intellectual disability and persons with mental illness. S.329(3) CrPC provides a distinct procedure for treatment of persons with intellectual disability (mental retardation). Since intellectual disability is a permanent condition, these persons are eligible to be discharged without trial under s.330(3). By proposing to replace ‘mental retardation’ with ‘mental illness’, the BNSS revokes the protection to this category of persons and unfairly excludes them from any protection under the fitness to stand trial framework. Considering the nature of their mental condition, it is absurd that persons with intellectual disability may be compelled to stand trial, exposing them to prolonged detention and violation of liberty even though they do not have the requisite ‘capacity’.[15] Persons with intellectual disability (mental retardation) are further excluded from other protections under BNSS. Unlike the CrPC, there is no provision in the BNSS allowing persons with ‘mental retardation’ to either be delivered to family or friends;[16] sent to safe custody;[17] undergo periodic review or assessment;[18] or be discharged[19] or acquitted due to mental incapacity at the time of commission of the offence.[20] This exclusion of persons with intellectual disability from safeguards under the BNSS puts them in a precarious position and adversely impacts their fair trial rights and personal liberty. The BNSS is not only inconsistent with the rights of persons with intellectual disability (mental retardation) but also creates procedural anomalies in the treatment of persons with mental illness under the fitness to stand trial framework. Both Cl.368(4) and proviso to Cl.368(3) is applicable to persons with mental illness against whom a prima facie case is made out. The anomaly lies in the fact that both clauses provide different outcomes for the treatment of the same class of persons without any conditions on application. While one provides for postponement of trial, the other provides for discharge under Cl.369, and neither makes any distinctions between the circumstances under which either of the outcomes would apply. As discussed earlier, the CrPC provides separate procedures for persons with mental illness and intellectual disability. Further, s.329 CrPC has been interpreted to provide distinct procedures for persons with treatable and untreatable mental illness.[21] While persons with mental illness are eligible for postponement of their trial, persons with untreatable mental illness and intellectual disability could be discharged under s.330 CrPC. The BNSS does not recognise any of these distinct categories but allows for separate outcomes without any guidance, leading to potential anomalies. III. No Real Solution While the CrPC is largely incongruent with the values and principles under the RPwD Act and the MHCA, these infirmities are carried forward in the proposed BNSS. The MHCA and RPwD Act are rights-based legislations which prioritise the liberty and dignity of persons with mental disability. Through the provision of accommodation and support, informed consent and periodic mental health assessment and reporting, the legislations allow for the realisation of the rights of all persons with mental disabilities. These priorities are not reflected in the present criminal law framework. The proposed bill makes no changes to the current framework of the CrPC. Instead it introduces a widespread change in terminology, leading to further confusion and discrimination. [1] Law Commission of India, ‘One Hundred and Fifty Fourth Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973’, Chapter XVI, Enquiry and trial of persons of unsound mind (Law Commission of India Report No. 154, 1996). [2] Caveat: This is dependant on the treatability of the mental condition. [3] Incapable of making their defence is understood

Premature release entails a prisoner’s release before the completion of his judicially ordained sentence. States may grant premature release to convicts owing to several factors, as laid down in the case of Bir Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, which includes good conduct by the prisoner, no commission of jail offence, prisoner’s punctual return from furlough, etc. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent case of Rashidul Jafar v. State of UP & Anr. has asserted that after the completion of fourteen years, a convict may be considered by the respective High Court of the state to be prematurely released, aside from release on bail. Remission is one such way through which such a release may be effectuated. A state government has the power under Section 59(5) of the Prisons Act, 1894, to take the necessary steps to amend the provisions of the Remission Rules at an earlier date, as laid down in the case of State of Haryana v. Mahender Singh. In the exercise of such provision, the Bihar government recently amended its prison manual to change Rule 481, thereby removing the clause that prohibits the release of any person convicted of killing a public servant on duty. This facilitated the premature release of over 20 convicts, including Anand Mohan, who was awarded life imprisonment by the Patna High Court for the murder of District Magistrate G. Krishnaiah. Mohan was released after serving 14 years of imprisonment. According to Bihar’s remission policy, such convicts were not eligible for premature release until they had completed a minimum of twenty years of their life sentence. This also came in succession to the release of 11 convicts guilty of the murder of Bilkis Bano, a clear subversion of justice by politics. Who has the Authority to grant Remission? The Apex Court relied on the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra and held that the power to grant remission is solely the domain of the appropriate government. Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC clarify that ‘appropriate government’ refers to the central government in cases where a sentence has been passed for an offence relating to the executive power of the union and the state government in other cases, such as when the offence is against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the state extends. Additionally, the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Sriharan & ors. held that to ascertain which government would be the appropriate government, the sentence imposed under the CrPC or any other law needs to be seen. The Mohd. Munna Case further laid down that the Prisons’ Rules are made under the Prisons Act, which by itself does not confer any authority to commute or remit a sentence. However, constitutionally, Articles 72 and 161empower the President and the Governor of the State, respectively, to grant remission, suspension, or commutation of the sentence to a convict. Further, the Laxman Naskar Case laid down that a life convict is not necessarily entitled to be released prematurely, but if the government frames any schemes or rules for early release of such convicts, they will be treated as guidelines for exercising its power under Article 161 of the Constitution.This article offers free shipping on qualified Face mask products, or buy online and pick up in store today at Medical Department The extent of the power to grant remission by the President and the Governor is absolute and cannot be fettered by virtue of any statutory provision, as held in the Maru Ram Case. It was further held that in the exercise of such powers, the President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers and the Governor acts on the advice of the State Government. Decoding the Unconstitutionality Behind Premature Release In the Satish Kumar Case, the Patna High Court held that the government may make a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia between the same class of prisoners for the purpose of granting remission. Such differentia is not based on a ‘yardstick,’ but on the basis of each circumstance, thereby making it discretionary. The discretionary power of the executive vis-à-vis granting of remission in itself is not unconstitutional but becomes so if such exercise is undertaken arbitrarily. The reasons for said unconstitutionality in both the Anand Mohan and Bilkis Bano cases begin with the disregard given to the factors relevant to determining premature release, the most important of them being the gravity of the offense. The possibility of reformation by itself does not tip the scales enough to undermine the gravity of the crime committed, as against what was held in the Bir Singh Case. In reference to this, the Supreme Court has sought original records to ascertain what consideration the decision to alter the policy is based on. This could be because the prima faciereason for the same appears to be a political one, as was apparent in the speech given by Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, whereby he assured the public that he ‘was working on bringing about the release of Mohan.’ Further, an additional link between all convicts who have been released remains their affiliation to minority caste groups in Bihar, and such a move could potentially aid the present government with vote bank politics. The constitutional protection of personal liberty should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner with respect to considering applications for premature release. Amendment of remission policies to favour a few in lieu of preferring applications for remission put forth by others remains arbitrary. It becomes the prerogative of the respective District Legal Services Authorities to ensure that the policy benefits all eligible prisoners equally. The Possibility for Retrospective Application of Remission Policy In State of Haryana v. Jagdish, the Apex Court had held that the premature release plea had to be considered on the basis of the policy as it stood on the day the accused was convicted by the Trial Court. In both the Anand Mohan and Bilkis Bano cases, the policy as it stood on the day of conviction made remission unconstitutional. In the former case, the policy with respect to remission as it stood on the day of

The laws ED deals with Currently, the ED deals with four laws: 1. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA):  It is a criminal law to prevent money laundering and to provide for confiscation of property involved in money laundering. 2. The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA):  A civil law that deals with the foreign exchange market in India. The website states that “ED has been given the responsibility to investigate suspected contraventions of foreign exchange laws and regulations, to adjudicate and impose penalties on those adjudged to have contravened the law.”  3. The Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 (FEOA):  This law deals with Indian offenders who move out of India to escape laws. This allows ED to attach properties of fugitive offenders who have escaped our country to avoid trial. According to the External Affairs Ministry, 25+ fugitive economic offenders have been living outside India, some of whom are popular businessmen such as Chetan Jayantilal Sandesara, Nitin Jayantilal Sandesara, Diptiben Chetankumar Sandesara, Nirav Modi, Vijay Mallya, Mehul Choksi, Sabya Seth, Rajiv Goyal, Alka Goyal, Lalit Modi, etc. #lawfirmindelhi #lawyerindelhi #advocateindelhi #criminaladvocateindelhi #Familymatterscasesindelhi. #domesticviolencecasesindelhi

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/ndps-act-can-accused-get-default-bail-if-fsl-report-isnt-submitted-with-chargesheet-within-prescribed-time-supreme-court-refers-to-larger-bench-255073?infinitescroll=1 The Supreme Court has referred to a larger bench the question as to whether a person accused of committing offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 is entitled to default bail on the failure of the prosecution to furnish the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory along with the chargesheet within the prescribed time.A two-judge bench comprising Justices.. https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/ndps-act-can-accused-get-default-bail-if-fsl-report-isnt-submitted-with-chargesheet-within-prescribed-time-supreme-court-refers-to-larger-bench-255073?infinitescroll=1 #NDPSLawyerindelhi. #ncbcaseslawyerindelhi. #criminalcaseslawyerindelhi. #advocatesindelhi #bestadvocatesindelhi

“Punishment is justice for the unjust”- a rather hunky-dory version of reality we witness sitting behind the screens. A long-standing tradition of punishing the wrongdoer finds its place in how law should protect even one innocent person no matter if a number of guilty people go unpunished in the process. This is wherein our Indian Penal Code acquires a centre-place in the Indian Judicial System which has been in existence since the advent of britishers to colonize India tracing its historical background to 1860s. The unravelling and audacious introduction of new bills as Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita and Bhartiya Sakshya discerns it as an unprecedented smacking of xenophobic tradition of laws with a touch of Hindi Nationalism across the subcontinent. Is it really Indianised and gender neutral as put forward? Dissection of the New Names of The Bills Nyay as derived from Sanskrit refers to an apparatus leading to justice which raises the ambiguity of how offences and punishment will align with this justice code at large. It is a wider term incorporating within it a variety of laws as under the sun whose intention is to uphold justice thereby formulating it as an all-in-one justice code foregoing the intricacies of the provisions and situations at hand. It reinforces the idea of how one should not judge a book by its cover i.e. to say merely substituting a Hindi name does not justify its efficiency rather it has herein created controversies of what is it that the government wants to add in and repeal in the guise of these new bills so as to ease their way forward. Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita is thus an intriguing name which is translated as bringing justice to court rather than the other way round where courts were the upholders of justice since time immemorial. The criminal law and its subsequent procedure furthermore find its place in the concurrent list of the Seventh Scheduleof Indian Constitution in turn entrusting both parliament and state legislatures to formulate laws with this respect. What we fail to reckon is how this might lead to political chaos and turbulence with each state renaming them in their own vernacular language under the name of validating diversity on one hand but eroding the unity on the other hand. This might prove threatening to the democratic ideal as embodied in our constitution which precedes the preamble with “We the people of India” which goes divided in these differential names for differing territories across the subcontinent. Gender Neutrality: Affirmative or Negative? A diverse country as India calls for a legal framework such that it adapts to the populace of every colour, caste, gender, race and sexuality with no lacunae of differential treatment as enshrined by the Article 14 in our Constitution holding all the other laws in place. This is something which cannot be overlooked even when one wants to trace its origin back to our long-standing history of despotic Mughal rule followed by arbitrary colonial rule thereby making it even more significant to delve into the question of whether the new provisions in this bill are affable towards all genders or is it still work in progress. The addition of the word ‘whoever’ in clause 69states how a person will be punished when engaged in luring a woman by deceitful means under the pretext of marriage; amendment to Section 376 of IPC with the addition of a new clause 64 has also found its place in the new proposed bill for the punishment of rape upon a woman under sixteen years of age as 20 years alongside a neutral provision of voyeurism enlisted herein have one thing in common when looked on from a magnified glass. It is that all these provisions are gender neutral from the point of view of accused but a little can be made out about the victim who has still been woman leaving no room of remedy for man as such i.e. even law overlooks the fact that women can do no wrong which is what needs to be transformed when we protest for equality and its assurance in every sphere of life then why should it go unnoticed when punishing the offender. Furthermore Section 376(d) dealing with gang rape is also similar wherein a woman cannot be convicted for the mere purpose that she cannot undertake such a heinous crime and can only be a victim in such a case making us ponder once again whether this justice code will actually bring justice or not?  Section 377 has also been withdrawn entirely thereby declaring it unconstitutional alongside the landmark judicial pronouncements such as Navtej Singh Johar vs Union of India which no matter however it was but still made space for some correctional remedies every now and then which has now been eroded under this new bill pending consideration in parliament. The jurisprudential question of emancipating our criminal justice system from the clutches of colonial legacy can be looked upon from a symbolic overhaul supplementing the changing dynamics of our society. There were as many as 313 changes put forth in this regard with the mere objective of how people approaching court with their grievances can be administered justice with no less than three years thereby increasing delay further because it is no surprise as to why “Justice delayed is justice denied” in its true sense. The new label attached to this code when translated reads as ‘Justice code’ or ‘Indian citizen protection act’ which is why we fail to reckon as to what the content of such a law is all about because it seems to be somewhat misleading if not incorrect in entirety. A criminal law which aims at giving each person his or her due in the form of justice cannot be studied without taking into consideration the theories of punishment thus acquiring a crucial role herein expressing as to why deterrent and reformative ones are most widely put to use in a country like India  i.e. our penal system strives for the betterment of populace at large with the underlying assumption that every person deserves a